Stories & Soliloquies

Tag: words

• The Philosopher’s Lexicon: Eschatology

  Posted at 1:30 pm by Michelle Joelle, on March 4, 2016

  Welcome back to The Philosopher’s Lexicon. My primary goal in this series is to explore common philosophical vocabulary, hopefully transforming these words from useless jargon into meaningful terms. My secondary goal is to highlight how contentious some of these terms can be – especially those which seem obvious. These definitions will not be comprehensive by any means, so please feel free to add your own understanding of each term as we go. This week’s edition kicks off a sub-series on theological terminology, which will continue for a few weeks.

  

  This week’s definition is a fairly brief one, and kicks off a sub-series. For the next few weeks I will be focusing on theological terms. Today we are starting with a brief, but important entry: eschatology.

  In short, an eschatological philosophy or theology is one that organizes itself in reference to the very end of things, be it the end of the life or the end of time. For Christian theology, this refers to the individual soul finding union with God in death, or in the Second Coming of Christ. For Islam and Judaism, this also comes in the form of Abrahamic messianism, which is the orientation not simply to an end point in general, but to a coming savior (or rather, messiah). While this view bears structural similarities to teleology in its orientation to an ultimate culminating point, eschatology puts the onus less on achieving a goal and more on what it means to live in the interim period between now and the end. For a messianic eschatology (either for the first or second coming of the messiah), this means that the interim period is hopelessly flawed, and that the end will come with the perfection of all things. In comparison with this infinitely distant ideal, our here and now can bear only inferior likeness, leaving us dependent upon God for salvation, whatever that might look like for each.

  In all cases, it refers to an inevitable end point. There are non-religious visions of eschatology that seek to understand how we live in terms of a future where humans cease to exist. These theories range from the scientific (the sun will burn out and unless humans find a new place to live, it will be end for us) to the metaphysical (that we will achieve some kind of perfection in the singularity of time) and more.

  Different philosophers and theologians take up this structural orientation in different ways, but generally speaking the big question of eschatology is what should we do with the time that is given to us, knowing that it is going to end? Do we keep plugging, knowing that all of our effort will come to naught in that end? Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings is a fantastic example of fighting “the long defeat” and facing the decline of the world, following the Medieval assumption that the world was at its most perfect at the dawn of creation and that it is slowly deprecating over time. However, being Catholic, Tolkien’s eschatology is messianic, tinged with hope. It acknowledges its own futility, and orients itself toward the Good in order to make the best of the time that is given, holding out hope for an impossible savior. As Gandalf says in Fellowship of the Ring, no matter what cards have been dealt to us,

  All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us.

  In essence, it’s a way of thinking that prioritizes our mortality, as individuals, and potentially as a species. What are we living for if we know we are going to die? How do we understand ourselves as finite beings?

  Tune in next week for the next installment of this sub-series of The Philosopher’s Lexicon on theological terminology, where I will tackle apophasis.
  Posted in Series | 6 Comments | Tagged academia, definitions, eschatology, lexicon, messianism, philosophy, theology, tolkien, words

• The Philosopher’s Lexicon: A Map of Distinctions, Part Four

  Posted at 1:00 pm by Michelle Joelle, on October 16, 2015

  Welcome back to The Philosopher’s Lexicon. My primary goal in this series is to explore common philosophical vocabulary, hopefully transforming these words from useless jargon into meaningful terms. My secondary goal is to highlight how contentious some of these terms can be – especially those which seem obvious. These definitions will not be comprehensive by any means, so please feel free to add your own understanding of each term as we go. 

  

  As I mentioned last week, the past several entries into The Philosopher’s Lexicon have all been double entries, focused not on one single vocabulary word per post, but on words that come in pairs, special distinctions in how we view and describe reality, thought, and knowledge. But these pairs don’t neatly align with each other, and as such, some cross-over explanation is needed. They way philosophers pick and choose from these distinctions is often key to their view of reality and knowledge.

  Last week, we covered the ways we can think in terms of logical and causal possibility. This week, we’ll move on to analytic and synthetic reasoning. While some repetition is inevitable, I will attempt to work systematically, contextualizing each distinction against the others, and as such each part of this series will be shorter than the last. Since this is the final part of the map, it will be the shortest of all.

  Without further ado, Part Four deals with what these distinctions mean in terms of propositions of analytic and synthetic reasoning.

  In terms of De Dicto/De Re, see Part One of the Map of Distinctions.

  In terms of Ontology and Epistemology, see Part Two of the Map of Distinctions.

  In terms of Logical and Causal Possibility, see Part Three of the Map of Distinctions.

  In terms of a priori and a posteriori knowledge:

  Here there are at least three possibilities I can conceive. The first relies on the weak sense of a priori knowledge; if all we mean by a priori knowledge is knowledge that we hold prior to a particular moment of exploration, as in, knowledge that we learned before the moment we begin to seek new information, then this leaves us with a clear sense of analysis, wherein analytic reasoning need only be a way of organizing existing information. Synthesis is then, self-evidently, a posteriori, as it requires the collection of new data or information.

  If we are to take the stronger versions of a priori and a posteriori knowledge, wherein the terms refer to inherent knowledge and learned knowledge, respectively, the relationship to analysis and synthesis is a bit different. In this case, a priori knowledge would be inherently analytical, and vice verse. No synthetic information from the senses would be required, as it would all be learned a posteriori. Knowledge would not merely be known a priori, but it could be analytically productive of meaningful truths. An example of this would be the ontological argument of Anselm.

  However, if what we mean by a priori knowledge is not a substantive content, but rather an organizing structure, then analysis would require a posteriori synthesis to fill in the variables, else we find ourselves playing around with nothing more than empty axioms and self-referential syllogisms. All meaningful thought would then require a combination of the two: there would be need to be analytical abilities a priori, wherein we plug a posteriori information to create new, synthetic truths. In other words, we would be said to be born with the ability to organize, and then find what needs organizing through experience. In other words still, you could say that we encounter a messy world of data that we have to organize according to our own interior understanding of simplicity. Neither the a priori nor the a posteriori would be meaningful on its own, and analysis and synthesis would be similarly reciprocally intertwined.

  _________________________

  And there it is, the end of the Map of Distinctions. It’s been more fun than I thought it would be. I must confess I thought retreading ground I’d already covered would be a little tedious, but I now imagine I could probably go over all of these terms again in a different way and see new possibilities I’ve overlooked here.

  For now, though, I’m going to return the lexicon back to normal, exploring one just vocabulary word at a time. Tune in next week to see where the lexicon goes next.
  Posted in Series | 0 Comments | Tagged a a priori, a posteriori, analytic truth, definitions, dictionary, lexicon, philosophy, synthetic truth, words

• The Philosopher’s Lexicon: A Map of Distinctions, Part Three

  Posted at 12:30 pm by Michelle Joelle, on October 9, 2015

  Welcome back to The Philosopher’s Lexicon. My primary goal in this series is to explore common philosophical vocabulary, hopefully transforming these words from useless jargon into meaningful terms. My secondary goal is to highlight how contentious some of these terms can be – especially those which seem obvious. These definitions will not be comprehensive by any means, so please feel free to add your own understanding of each term as we go. 

  

  As I mentioned last week, the past several entries into The Philosopher’s Lexicon have all been double entries, focused not on one single vocabulary word per post, but on words that come in pairs, special distinctions in how we view and describe reality, thought, and knowledge. But these pairs don’t neatly align with each other, and as such, some cross-over explanation is needed. They way philosophers pick and choose from these distinctions is often key to their view of reality and knowledge.

  Last week, we covered the ways we can think in terms of Ontology and Epistemology, and a few weeks before we covered the De Dicto/De Re distinction. This week, we’ll move on to logical and causal possibility. While some repetition is inevitable, I will attempt to work systematically, contextualizing each distinction against the others, and as such each part of this series will be shorter than the last.

  Without further ado, Part Three deals with what these distinctions mean in terms of propositions of logical and causal possibility.

  In terms of De Dicto/De Re, see Part One of the Map of Distinctions.

  In terms of Ontology and Epistemology, see Part Two of the Map of Distinctions.

  In terms of Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning:

  Roughly speaking, it can be easy to match logical possibility with analytic reasoning, and causal possibility with synthetic reasoning. Analysis is required to determine logical possibility, and an understanding of causal possibility is what allows us to synthesize and incorporate new information into our line of thinking. But analysis is also required in synthesis, as causal possibility presupposes logical possibility; even if we believe that there are phenomena that exist outside of our rational schema, our ability to explain causal relationships depends upon that schema. Any phenomena that exists outside of reason may be collected as data, but without analytical cogency, cannot be synthesized into a coherent causal explanation.

  The only place that these two sets of distinctions do not overlap is that synthetic reasoning need not be consulted when determining logical possibility.

  In terms of a priori and a posteriori knowledge:

  This one is a bit tricky. The obvious connections are between logical possibility and a priori knowledge, and between causal possibility and a posteriori knowledge, but as usual, this depends on what philosophers you consult.

  If logical possibility aims primarily to determine what we are capable of thinking without contradiction, then for those who believe we are born with reason a priori would indeed find that as the source of our ability to do so. However, for those who do not believe we are born with any a priori knowledge, the rational capacity that allows us to think through logical possibilities would be drawn from a posteriori experience, even if it need not follow the dictates of that experience. Basically, even without a priori knowledge, we can draw out patterns from our a posteriori experience that we can then use to determine future possibility, even when it isn’t grounded causally. This, essentially, would become a weak understanding of a priori – rather than framing it as innate knowledge, it would be only knowledge that has been learned previously, rather that explicitly verified.

  To put it more simply, if one believes that logic itself is learned a posteriori, then logical possibility will derive from learned experience, even if it does not consult the causal possibility that also governs that experience. Reason would be more of an abstraction from the limits of experience than a function in its own right.

  Causal possibility requires both this logic and explicitly a posteriori information, as it hinges upon the laws of nature and the complexity of causal chains as they exist in the world. Thus, if someone believes that logic is a priori, then casual possibility requires both a priori and a posteriori knowledge; but if logical possibility can be drawn from a posteriori knowledge in some, either to create weak a priori knowledge or else ground reason as something taught and learned, then strong a priori – which refers to innate knowledge or an innate capacity to reason – is not necessary. In fact, in this version of things, causal possibility would be primary, giving rise to logical possibility as we learn more and more information that allows us to extrapolate away from the limits of finite experience to imagine logical possibilities beyond what we can observe.

  _______________

  The next installment of The Philosopher’s Lexicon will bring us to the end of our Map of Distinctions. Tune in for the grand finale, to be posted in the coming weeks.

  Posted in Series | 6 Comments | Tagged academia, causal possibility, definitions, lexicon, logical possibility, philosophy, words

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