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    • The Philosopher’s Lexicon: A Map of Distinctions, Part Two

      Posted at 12:30 pm by Michelle Joelle, on September 25, 2015

      Welcome back to The Philosopher’s Lexicon. My primary goal in this series is to explore common philosophical vocabulary, hopefully transforming these words from useless jargon into meaningful terms. My secondary goal is to highlight how contentious some of these terms can be – especially those which seem obvious. These definitions will not be comprehensive by any means, so please feel free to add your own understanding of each term as we go. 

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      As I mentioned last week, the past several entries into The Philosopher’s Lexicon have all been double entries, focused not on one single vocabulary word per post, but on words that come in pairs, special distinctions in how we view and describe reality, thought, and knowledge. As such, last week I started to offer a recapitulation in terms of how we can and cannot mix our terms consistently. Last week, we covered the De Dicto/De Re Distinction. While some repetition is inevitable, I will attempt to work systematically, contextualizing each distinction against the others. This week, we’re moving onto part two, covering Ontology and Epistemology in terms of Logical and Causal Possibility, Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning, and A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge.

      Without further ado, Part Two deals with what these distinctions mean in terms of propositions taken ontologically and epistemology.

      In terms of De Dicto/De Re, see Part One of the Map of Distinctions.

      In terms of Logical and Causal Possibility:

      Simply put, “ontology” is the study of being and existence. When philosophers speak of a thing’s “ontological status”, they’re speaking about how “real” that thing is. This means that when we’re dealing with possibility, whether or not we mean that possibility to be logical or causal, we’re not dealing with ontology per se, but only with – you guessed it – ontological possibility. If you’re a strict materialist, then ontological possibility will be based in both logical and causal possibility. On the opposite end of the spectrum, a strictly theoretical rationalist, there are plenty of philosophers and scientists who find that logical and causal possibility themselves have ontological status, albeit in a different way than that which is verifiable. There are even some philosophers and scientists who need only logical possibility to ontologically ground their theories, as in the case of ontological proofs for God’s existence, and in some versions of the Multiverse theory.

      More generally, there also are likely many things that exist ontologically that don’t fit within the confines of either logical or causal possibility such as we know them.

      Epistemologically, logical and causal possibility are extremely useful tools for helping us learn and understand the world. Epistemology is the study of what we can know, and so determining how our minds work (logical possibility) and how the outside world works (causal possibility) is self-evidently significant. While it is contestable that the laws of logic and the laws of nature govern in an ontological sense, it is indisputable that they represent what we “know”, and how we think.

      In terms of Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning:

      For a materialist, ontologically, all analytic reasoning is a language game, while all true reasoning must be grounded synthetically. For a rationalist, however, the axioms required for analytically reasoning are ontologically true, and ground the reality of synthetic notions. And of course, there are many thinkers that fall somewhere in between these two extremes.

      Epistemologically, both categories are useful ways of describing methods of verification. In order to know or understand the world, we need to be at least analytically cogent (math, religion, theoretical physics, logic, etc.). To actually do something with this knowledge, this analysis ought also be synthetically supported (social science, medicine, experimental physics, military strategy). And for some things, the synthetic support is all we have, and there’s work yet to be done analytically before can truly say we understand it, if ever (any newly discovered or understudied phenomena, poetry, art, mystic religion).

      In terms of a priori and a posteriori knowledge:

      Since these terms refer to knowledge, ontologically, the options here are as open and varied as possible. There are some who believe that only a priori knowledge has any connection to ontological reality, as in many strains of Platonic, idealist, and Abrahamic religious philosophy, wherein a posteriori knowledge is merely an illusion. There are some who believe that there is no such thing as  a priori knowledge. There are even some who think that no knowledge, prior or posterior has any ontological status, and some who think both are equally real. Nearly any combination can be argued,  though of course, some arguments are better than others.

      And both are self-evidently epistemological in nature, as they refer to types of knowledge. It is however possible to argue that only one or the other represents “true” knowledge, and that there is no knowledge and thus no need to quantify when it is received.

      Tune in next time for Part Three of the Map of Distinctions.

      Posted in Series | 1 Comment | Tagged academia, definitions, epistemology, lexicon, ontology, philosophy
    • The Philosopher’s Lexicon: A Map of Distinctions, Part One

      Posted at 1:00 pm by Michelle Joelle, on September 4, 2015

      Now that summer is over, it is quite past time to return to blogging. It feels right to start up again with a continuation of my series on philosophical definitions, The Philosopher’s Lexicon. My primary goal in this series is to explore common philosophical vocabulary, hopefully transforming these words from useless jargon into meaningful terms. My secondary goal is to highlight how contentious some of these terms can be – especially those which seem obvious. These definitions will not be comprehensive by any means, so please feel free to add your own understanding of each term as we go. 

      magnifier-389900_640

      The past several entries into The Philosopher’s Lexicon have all been double entries, focused not on one single vocabulary word per post, but on words that come in pairs, special distinctions in how we view and describe reality, thought, and knowledge. The comments on these posts have been fascinating and engaging, and I’d like to take a few weeks to pause and look at how these distinctions can and do interact with each other to form different philosophical viewpoints.

      As such, the next five entries will not be new, but will offer a recapitulation in terms of how we can and cannot mix our terms consistently. The terms to be covered in this series are as follows, with an entry to be devoted to each:

      1. De Dicto/De Re Distinction
      2. Ontology and Epistemology
      3. Logical and Causal Possibility
      4. Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning
      5. A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge

      While some repetition is inevitable, I will attempt to work systematically, contextualizing each distinction against the others.

      Let’s start Part One with what these distinctions mean in terms of propositions taken de dicto and de re.

      In terms of ontology and epistemology: 

      To take a proposition de dicto is to take meaning from the words themselves, rather than using the words to indicate some extra-literal meaning outside the proposition. While it is easy to see how de dicto meaning can be epistemologically significant, it can also – and often is also – taken ontologically. For many the language of an idea is the idea, and that the power of the idea comes in its formulation. Epistemologically, the right formulation of an idea (the right equation, the eloquent phrasing, the poignant image, etc.) is what renders the idea useful, inspiring, and even more glorious, but for some the power is literally, ontologically, in the name. That’s why memorization is such a huge part of our education, why people believe there is “new math”, and why the names of God are taken to be so historically, culturally, and religiously important. For others, though, de dicto propositions are merely linguistic tools, and thus do not carry the ontological status of the reality they signify.

      Propositions de re are necessarily intended to speak ontologically, but for philosophers who align the epistemological with the ontological (Plato, for example), the de re is epistemologically self-revelatory.

      In terms of logical and causal possibility:

      In this case, a proposition taken de dicto may yet again be either. Logically, the formulation of the propositions carries inherent meaning, forging connections and equations that must resolve in specific ways, rendering de dicto thinking itself logically necessary for crafting logical lines of argumentation. Because all causal reasoning must also be logically possible, the significance of de dicto focus is often the same in contemporary scientific practice. However, that which is casually possible is often observable in ways that require no specifically logical predetermination, post-experiential explanation need not conform to specific logical precepts, either by prompting a rethinking of existing standards (quantum physics, religious experience, artistic expression, etc.) or in the case of human error, wherein the idea is true, but the explanation is poorly constructed.

      For many, de re propositions must be logically possible. For others, while this is a handy way to simplify the process of learning and true most of the time, it is ultimately too limited. In this view, it seems that things may be true de re even if our de dicto logic is inadequate to the task, either because our logic needs refining (as when we revise our logical language to include greater possibility, or because de re truth is transcendent in someway (either religiously or spiritually, as in the case of the Catholic Trinity), or  because our logic, as a construct of our minds, is inferior to the task of explaining things comprehensively (as in the case of Godel’s incompleteness theorem).

      In terms of analytic and synthetic reasoning:

      Similarly, de dicto propositions can be easily taken analytically, since analysis often happens by examining the relationships between signs and symbols and the construction of order. There need not necessarily be truth de re, analytically. However, analytical reasons as it is applied to logic need not be taken explicitly de dicto, since this would be a meta-logical movement out of the existing rational system, potentially into another system (such as in the creation of new equations, logical languages, etc.). Causally, the meaning of de dicto propositions is second always to the de re realities they describe and which condition their predictions.

      In terms of a priori and a posteriori knowledge:

      Simply put, all de dicto understand must be a posteriori. Even if you believe that logic is known a priori, the language of logic must be learned or created from signs and symbols. The determination of de re truth, however, may be either innately held a priori, learned only through a posteriori experience, or come from a complex combination of the two, depending upon who you ask.

      Tune in next week for Part Two of the Map of Distinctions.

      Posted in Series | 7 Comments | Tagged academia, de dicto/de re, definitions, epistemology, lexicon, ontology, philosophy, terminology
    • The Philosopher’s Lexicon: Ontology and Epistemology

      Posted at 1:00 pm by Michelle Joelle, on April 24, 2015

      Welcome back to The Philosopher’s Lexicon. My primary goal in this series is to explore common philosophical vocabulary, hopefully transforming these words from useless jargon into meaningful terms. My secondary goal is to highlight how contentious some of these terms can be – especially those which seem obvious. These definitions will not be comprehensive by any means, so please feel free to add your own understanding of each term as we go. 

      magnifier-389900_640

      One of the words for this week is “ontology”. Inspired by the post “Down With Reality” from the blog Blogging Is a Responsibility, I realized that no philosopher’s lexicon can be complete without this word. However, taken on its own, “ontology” is a tricky business, and so I will be pairing it with another philosophical concept: epistemology. Taken together, these terms are far easier to understand than they are in isolation.

      Ontology is, technically speaking, the study of being itself. What does it mean for something to exist? What does it mean for something to be “real”? You will often hear this term within the context of a debate over the “ontological status” of some proposed entity. What makes this a murky question is that the answer often comes in terms of degrees or sub-definitions.

      For example, when a philosopher raises questions about the ontological status of counting numbers, the question isn’t just asking whether or not counting numbers are real, but in what way they can be said to be real. Are they symbols which signify some conceptual reality that exists independently of themselves? Or is the concept of “number” bound up within the symbol itself? Are numbers actual objects of knowledge, or merely tools which aid our human knowledge, and not themselves objects of that knowledge?

      Epistemology is often posited as an alternative to ontology, as we see in the example above. Epistemology, strictly speaking, is the study of knowledge, and it too can often be found in the form of an adjective, treading in the murky waters of degree and sub-definition. When we ask about the epistemological status of numbers, we are primarily attempting to classify in what ways numbers can be known, and in what ways they aid in giving us knowledge of true things outside of our minds.

      To put it simply, ontology is about the nature of existence, and epistemology is about the way we know and understand things which can be said or thought to exist. These terms become most confusing when we mix them together, either intentionally or unintentionally.

      One example of an intentional collapse of the terms comes to us from Plato’s Republic. In the Republic, Socrates argues that all things which are ontologically real must be epistemologically knowable to a parallel degree, and then takes the converse to be equally true. Individual physical things are only knowable to individual people who have encountered those physical objects during their short lives, and are thus only real in a very limited way. However the idea behind a given physical object – its category, or the mathematical concepts that compose it – can be known with or without physical engagement with any particular object, and are thus real in a way that physical objects never can be. For instance, you may see many different individual chairs come and go, but the idea of the chair exists in your mind and in your knowledge regardless. Beyond that, your knowledge of the shapes made by those chairs can exist with or without any experience with any particular physical object at all. And beyond that, the pure ideas of “order” and “goodness” are independently knowable to anyone in any time, and are thus the most real of all. The union of the ontological and the epistemological here is the foundation of what people think of as Plato’s “theory of forms”, requiring an assumption of metaphysical ontology. Taken more empirically, such a union can lead to Berkley’s idealism, requiring an omniscient figure to explain away the threat of ontological solipsism.

      While the intentional collapse of ontology and epistemology is plenty objectionable to many philosophers and thinkers who would see these two qualifiers as explicitly separate, I think that the unintentional collapse of the two terms is far more dangerous. I think, however, that I’ve covered this as thoroughly as I am currently able in my posts on teaching, language, and the de dicto/de re distinction. However, keeping these two categories completely separate is not just itself a difficult task, but it raises a whole new set of difficulties about whether – and how – we can ever encounter and understand reality just as it is, or if we’ll only ever be able to develop our own mediated version of it.

      In other words, we might just be finding our way into an epistemological solipsism instead. And if the ontological and epistemological are truly separate, is there any way to know if we’ve ever known something real?

      Posted in Series | 14 Comments | Tagged academia, definitions, epistemology, knowledge, lexicon, ontology, philosophy, reality, vocabulary, words
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