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  • Tag: logical possibility

    • The Philosopher’s Lexicon: A Map of Distinctions, Part Three

      Posted at 12:30 pm by Michelle Joelle, on October 9, 2015

      Welcome back to The Philosopher’s Lexicon. My primary goal in this series is to explore common philosophical vocabulary, hopefully transforming these words from useless jargon into meaningful terms. My secondary goal is to highlight how contentious some of these terms can be – especially those which seem obvious. These definitions will not be comprehensive by any means, so please feel free to add your own understanding of each term as we go. 

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      As I mentioned last week, the past several entries into The Philosopher’s Lexicon have all been double entries, focused not on one single vocabulary word per post, but on words that come in pairs, special distinctions in how we view and describe reality, thought, and knowledge. But these pairs don’t neatly align with each other, and as such, some cross-over explanation is needed. They way philosophers pick and choose from these distinctions is often key to their view of reality and knowledge.

      Last week, we covered the ways we can think in terms of Ontology and Epistemology, and a few weeks before we covered the De Dicto/De Re distinction. This week, we’ll move on to logical and causal possibility. While some repetition is inevitable, I will attempt to work systematically, contextualizing each distinction against the others, and as such each part of this series will be shorter than the last.

      Without further ado, Part Three deals with what these distinctions mean in terms of propositions of logical and causal possibility.

      In terms of De Dicto/De Re, see Part One of the Map of Distinctions.

      In terms of Ontology and Epistemology, see Part Two of the Map of Distinctions.

      In terms of Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning:

      Roughly speaking, it can be easy to match logical possibility with analytic reasoning, and causal possibility with synthetic reasoning. Analysis is required to determine logical possibility, and an understanding of causal possibility is what allows us to synthesize and incorporate new information into our line of thinking. But analysis is also required in synthesis, as causal possibility presupposes logical possibility; even if we believe that there are phenomena that exist outside of our rational schema, our ability to explain causal relationships depends upon that schema. Any phenomena that exists outside of reason may be collected as data, but without analytical cogency, cannot be synthesized into a coherent causal explanation.

      The only place that these two sets of distinctions do not overlap is that synthetic reasoning need not be consulted when determining logical possibility.

      In terms of a priori and a posteriori knowledge:

      This one is a bit tricky. The obvious connections are between logical possibility and a priori knowledge, and between causal possibility and a posteriori knowledge, but as usual, this depends on what philosophers you consult.

      If logical possibility aims primarily to determine what we are capable of thinking without contradiction, then for those who believe we are born with reason a priori would indeed find that as the source of our ability to do so. However, for those who do not believe we are born with any a priori knowledge, the rational capacity that allows us to think through logical possibilities would be drawn from a posteriori experience, even if it need not follow the dictates of that experience. Basically, even without a priori knowledge, we can draw out patterns from our a posteriori experience that we can then use to determine future possibility, even when it isn’t grounded causally. This, essentially, would become a weak understanding of a priori – rather than framing it as innate knowledge, it would be only knowledge that has been learned previously, rather that explicitly verified.

      To put it more simply, if one believes that logic itself is learned a posteriori, then logical possibility will derive from learned experience, even if it does not consult the causal possibility that also governs that experience. Reason would be more of an abstraction from the limits of experience than a function in its own right.

      Causal possibility requires both this logic and explicitly a posteriori information, as it hinges upon the laws of nature and the complexity of causal chains as they exist in the world. Thus, if someone believes that logic is a priori, then casual possibility requires both a priori and a posteriori knowledge; but if logical possibility can be drawn from a posteriori knowledge in some, either to create weak a priori knowledge or else ground reason as something taught and learned, then strong a priori – which refers to innate knowledge or an innate capacity to reason – is not necessary. In fact, in this version of things, causal possibility would be primary, giving rise to logical possibility as we learn more and more information that allows us to extrapolate away from the limits of finite experience to imagine logical possibilities beyond what we can observe.

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      The next installment of The Philosopher’s Lexicon will bring us to the end of our Map of Distinctions. Tune in for the grand finale, to be posted in the coming weeks.

      Posted in Series | 6 Comments | Tagged academia, causal possibility, definitions, lexicon, logical possibility, philosophy, words
    • The Philosopher’s Lexicon: Logical and Causal Possibility

      Posted at 12:00 pm by Michelle Joelle, on May 1, 2015

      Welcome back to The Philosopher’s Lexicon. My primary goal in this series is to explore common philosophical vocabulary, hopefully transforming these words from useless jargon into meaningful terms. My secondary goal is to highlight how contentious some of these terms can be – especially those which seem obvious. These definitions will not be comprehensive by any means, so please feel free to add your own understanding of each term as we go. 

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      This week’s entry into the Philosopher’s Lexicon will once again explore a distinction rather than a solitary term: the difference between logical possibility and causal possibility, a distinction which comes to me from Kant, quite generally, and Nils Ch. Rauhut’s Ultimate Questions, more specifically. What I  find most interesting about Rauhut’s take is his shift away from the more common, yet slightly intimidating conversation about logical and causal necessity to the more open realm of possibility.

      Like the difference between statements made de dicto and statements made de re, and between ontology and epistemology, the difference between logical and causal possibility is key to understanding, analyzing, and evaluating a philosophical theory. Understanding this distinction is also important when crafting theories and – especially – thought experiments and predictive models not just in philosophy, but in mathematics, the hard sciences, and the social sciences as well.

      When we decide whether or not something could happen, we are typically speaking in terms of causal possibility. Causal possibility – and not “casual” possibility (as it is often mis-written) – refers to things that could happen in the world, given its present state. That means we have to take into consideration not just the laws of logic, but the laws of physics, the current circumstances, the available resources, and more.

      One of the conditions of causal possibility is logical possibility. In order for a proposed scenario to be logically possible, you have to be able to imagine the proposal – either in literal images, or in symbolic representation (i.e., math, words, or formal language) – without experiencing any internal contradiction. The proposal doesn’t have to be physically possible, or likely to happen, but merely logically imaginable. To wit: for a proposal to be causally possible, it must be logically possible, but logical possibility has no requirement of causal possibility.

      For example, the statement “Without the aid of technology, a man can fly to the moon” may not be causally possible (due to the physical limits of human beings and the distance to the moon, among other things), but it is logically possible. It’s easy to imagine, even picture. In Ultimate Questions, Rauhut offers a helpful rule of thumb for determining logical possibility: if you could picture the proposal happening in your mind, it is logically possible. In truth, you may need to elaborately track premises or do complex equations to “draw” the picture, but the principle stands.

      On the other hand, the statement “Without the aid of technology, a man can walk ten miles” is both logically possible – easy to picture without experiencing an internal contradiction – and causally possible – humans are fully capable of walking ten miles.

      Finally, the statement “Bill is both physically taller and shorter than Sam” is both logically – and thus causally – impossible. It cannot be imagined or depicted even in the most logically isolated circumstances, and thus could never causally happen.

      In short, when crafting or assessing whether a proposition is realistic, it’s important to take stock of what kind of possibility you are intending to establish. If we mix up our categories, we’ll likely reject useful logical propositions because they’re causally outlandish, and fear unlikely causal scenarios because they make logical sense.

      Posted in Series | 22 Comments | Tagged causal possibility, definitions, epistemology, lexicon, logical possibility, philosophy, words
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