Stories & Soliloquies

Stories & Soliloquies
  • About my Soliloquies
  • Metaphysics, Myth, & Magic
  • My Poetry & Fiction
  • Philosopher Fridays
  • The Philosopher’s Lexicon
  • Tag: epistemology

    • The Philosopher’s Lexicon: A Map of Distinctions, Part Two

      Posted at 12:30 pm by Michelle Joelle, on September 25, 2015

      Welcome back to The Philosopher’s Lexicon. My primary goal in this series is to explore common philosophical vocabulary, hopefully transforming these words from useless jargon into meaningful terms. My secondary goal is to highlight how contentious some of these terms can be – especially those which seem obvious. These definitions will not be comprehensive by any means, so please feel free to add your own understanding of each term as we go. 

      magnifier-389900_640

      As I mentioned last week, the past several entries into The Philosopher’s Lexicon have all been double entries, focused not on one single vocabulary word per post, but on words that come in pairs, special distinctions in how we view and describe reality, thought, and knowledge. As such, last week I started to offer a recapitulation in terms of how we can and cannot mix our terms consistently. Last week, we covered the De Dicto/De Re Distinction. While some repetition is inevitable, I will attempt to work systematically, contextualizing each distinction against the others. This week, we’re moving onto part two, covering Ontology and Epistemology in terms of Logical and Causal Possibility, Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning, and A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge.

      Without further ado, Part Two deals with what these distinctions mean in terms of propositions taken ontologically and epistemology.

      In terms of De Dicto/De Re, see Part One of the Map of Distinctions.

      In terms of Logical and Causal Possibility:

      Simply put, “ontology” is the study of being and existence. When philosophers speak of a thing’s “ontological status”, they’re speaking about how “real” that thing is. This means that when we’re dealing with possibility, whether or not we mean that possibility to be logical or causal, we’re not dealing with ontology per se, but only with – you guessed it – ontological possibility. If you’re a strict materialist, then ontological possibility will be based in both logical and causal possibility. On the opposite end of the spectrum, a strictly theoretical rationalist, there are plenty of philosophers and scientists who find that logical and causal possibility themselves have ontological status, albeit in a different way than that which is verifiable. There are even some philosophers and scientists who need only logical possibility to ontologically ground their theories, as in the case of ontological proofs for God’s existence, and in some versions of the Multiverse theory.

      More generally, there also are likely many things that exist ontologically that don’t fit within the confines of either logical or causal possibility such as we know them.

      Epistemologically, logical and causal possibility are extremely useful tools for helping us learn and understand the world. Epistemology is the study of what we can know, and so determining how our minds work (logical possibility) and how the outside world works (causal possibility) is self-evidently significant. While it is contestable that the laws of logic and the laws of nature govern in an ontological sense, it is indisputable that they represent what we “know”, and how we think.

      In terms of Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning:

      For a materialist, ontologically, all analytic reasoning is a language game, while all true reasoning must be grounded synthetically. For a rationalist, however, the axioms required for analytically reasoning are ontologically true, and ground the reality of synthetic notions. And of course, there are many thinkers that fall somewhere in between these two extremes.

      Epistemologically, both categories are useful ways of describing methods of verification. In order to know or understand the world, we need to be at least analytically cogent (math, religion, theoretical physics, logic, etc.). To actually do something with this knowledge, this analysis ought also be synthetically supported (social science, medicine, experimental physics, military strategy). And for some things, the synthetic support is all we have, and there’s work yet to be done analytically before can truly say we understand it, if ever (any newly discovered or understudied phenomena, poetry, art, mystic religion).

      In terms of a priori and a posteriori knowledge:

      Since these terms refer to knowledge, ontologically, the options here are as open and varied as possible. There are some who believe that only a priori knowledge has any connection to ontological reality, as in many strains of Platonic, idealist, and Abrahamic religious philosophy, wherein a posteriori knowledge is merely an illusion. There are some who believe that there is no such thing as  a priori knowledge. There are even some who think that no knowledge, prior or posterior has any ontological status, and some who think both are equally real. Nearly any combination can be argued,  though of course, some arguments are better than others.

      And both are self-evidently epistemological in nature, as they refer to types of knowledge. It is however possible to argue that only one or the other represents “true” knowledge, and that there is no knowledge and thus no need to quantify when it is received.

      Tune in next time for Part Three of the Map of Distinctions.

      Posted in Series | 1 Comment | Tagged academia, definitions, epistemology, lexicon, ontology, philosophy
    • The Philosopher’s Lexicon: A Map of Distinctions, Part One

      Posted at 1:00 pm by Michelle Joelle, on September 4, 2015

      Now that summer is over, it is quite past time to return to blogging. It feels right to start up again with a continuation of my series on philosophical definitions, The Philosopher’s Lexicon. My primary goal in this series is to explore common philosophical vocabulary, hopefully transforming these words from useless jargon into meaningful terms. My secondary goal is to highlight how contentious some of these terms can be – especially those which seem obvious. These definitions will not be comprehensive by any means, so please feel free to add your own understanding of each term as we go. 

      magnifier-389900_640

      The past several entries into The Philosopher’s Lexicon have all been double entries, focused not on one single vocabulary word per post, but on words that come in pairs, special distinctions in how we view and describe reality, thought, and knowledge. The comments on these posts have been fascinating and engaging, and I’d like to take a few weeks to pause and look at how these distinctions can and do interact with each other to form different philosophical viewpoints.

      As such, the next five entries will not be new, but will offer a recapitulation in terms of how we can and cannot mix our terms consistently. The terms to be covered in this series are as follows, with an entry to be devoted to each:

      1. De Dicto/De Re Distinction
      2. Ontology and Epistemology
      3. Logical and Causal Possibility
      4. Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning
      5. A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge

      While some repetition is inevitable, I will attempt to work systematically, contextualizing each distinction against the others.

      Let’s start Part One with what these distinctions mean in terms of propositions taken de dicto and de re.

      In terms of ontology and epistemology: 

      To take a proposition de dicto is to take meaning from the words themselves, rather than using the words to indicate some extra-literal meaning outside the proposition. While it is easy to see how de dicto meaning can be epistemologically significant, it can also – and often is also – taken ontologically. For many the language of an idea is the idea, and that the power of the idea comes in its formulation. Epistemologically, the right formulation of an idea (the right equation, the eloquent phrasing, the poignant image, etc.) is what renders the idea useful, inspiring, and even more glorious, but for some the power is literally, ontologically, in the name. That’s why memorization is such a huge part of our education, why people believe there is “new math”, and why the names of God are taken to be so historically, culturally, and religiously important. For others, though, de dicto propositions are merely linguistic tools, and thus do not carry the ontological status of the reality they signify.

      Propositions de re are necessarily intended to speak ontologically, but for philosophers who align the epistemological with the ontological (Plato, for example), the de re is epistemologically self-revelatory.

      In terms of logical and causal possibility:

      In this case, a proposition taken de dicto may yet again be either. Logically, the formulation of the propositions carries inherent meaning, forging connections and equations that must resolve in specific ways, rendering de dicto thinking itself logically necessary for crafting logical lines of argumentation. Because all causal reasoning must also be logically possible, the significance of de dicto focus is often the same in contemporary scientific practice. However, that which is casually possible is often observable in ways that require no specifically logical predetermination, post-experiential explanation need not conform to specific logical precepts, either by prompting a rethinking of existing standards (quantum physics, religious experience, artistic expression, etc.) or in the case of human error, wherein the idea is true, but the explanation is poorly constructed.

      For many, de re propositions must be logically possible. For others, while this is a handy way to simplify the process of learning and true most of the time, it is ultimately too limited. In this view, it seems that things may be true de re even if our de dicto logic is inadequate to the task, either because our logic needs refining (as when we revise our logical language to include greater possibility, or because de re truth is transcendent in someway (either religiously or spiritually, as in the case of the Catholic Trinity), or  because our logic, as a construct of our minds, is inferior to the task of explaining things comprehensively (as in the case of Godel’s incompleteness theorem).

      In terms of analytic and synthetic reasoning:

      Similarly, de dicto propositions can be easily taken analytically, since analysis often happens by examining the relationships between signs and symbols and the construction of order. There need not necessarily be truth de re, analytically. However, analytical reasons as it is applied to logic need not be taken explicitly de dicto, since this would be a meta-logical movement out of the existing rational system, potentially into another system (such as in the creation of new equations, logical languages, etc.). Causally, the meaning of de dicto propositions is second always to the de re realities they describe and which condition their predictions.

      In terms of a priori and a posteriori knowledge:

      Simply put, all de dicto understand must be a posteriori. Even if you believe that logic is known a priori, the language of logic must be learned or created from signs and symbols. The determination of de re truth, however, may be either innately held a priori, learned only through a posteriori experience, or come from a complex combination of the two, depending upon who you ask.

      Tune in next week for Part Two of the Map of Distinctions.

      Posted in Series | 7 Comments | Tagged academia, de dicto/de re, definitions, epistemology, lexicon, ontology, philosophy, terminology
    • The Philosopher’s Lexicon: A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge

      Posted at 12:30 pm by Michelle Joelle, on May 29, 2015

      Welcome back to The Philosopher’s Lexicon. My primary goal in this series is to explore common philosophical vocabulary, hopefully transforming these words from useless jargon into meaningful terms. My secondary goal is to highlight how contentious some of these terms can be – especially those which seem obvious. These definitions will not be comprehensive by any means, so please feel free to add your own understanding of each term as we go. 

      magnifier-389900_640

      This week’s entry into the lexicon will be the last of a string of distinctions. I began some weeks ago by discussing the de dicto/de re distinction, then moved onto the distinction between ontology and epistemology, after which I tackled logical and causal possibly, and most recently I covered the difference between analytic and synthetic reasoning. To these, I add the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, a classification which I first encountered as a philosophy student in Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and A. C. Grayling’s An Introduction to Philosophical Logic, and is explained well in Nils Ch. Rauhut’s Ultimate Questions.

      In its weaker sense, a priori knowledge is knowledge that requires no external experience to comprehend. All you have to do is think things through according to the knowledge you already have. A priori knowledge can be verified without leaving your desk according to what you already know. This can refer to analytic deduction: no external validation is required to affirm the truth of tautological definitions like “A bachelor is an unmarried man” or equations like “10 + 10 = 20”. This is a weak definition of a priori knowledge because it refers only to knowledge that you learned earlier, meaning you could have learned that knowledge from earlier experience.

      The stronger sense of the word refers to knowledge that is innately held. This is obviously more controversial, as it assumes that we are born with knowledge prior to our experience with the world, usually eternal truths and immutable forms. Plato’s theory of knowledge is that when we learn anything in the world, what we’re really doing is recalling truths we already knew by virtue of have a knowing soul (nous). When we think we’re leaning from experience, we’re really just reminding ourselves of things we already knew, but haven’t yet named. While some versions of Platonism claim that this means we are born with perfect geometric forms in our minds, I tend to think Plato’s intention was that we were born with more abstract concepts of order and pattern. But that’s a post for another day.

      In contrast, a posteriori knowledge comes to us through our experience – literally, post or after our perceptions. A posteriori knowledge requires that we gather new information to verify, such as synthetic statements like “Bill is a bachelor” or “Bill has 10 apples in a basket, and 10 on the counter, making 20 in total”. We’ll have to go and consult with Bill to know if either of these statements are true – no amount of thinking can override our need to gather new information.

      While in philosophy the terms are mostly used in reference to logic and Kant, the difference between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is essential in machine learning and artificial intelligence. Siri, Google Now, and other new technologies rely on creating systems that mix pre-programmed structures (a priori knowledge) with millions of examples gathered from the real world (a posteriori knowledge).

      These terms may seem redundant when placed in context with “analytic and synthetic reasoning” and “logical and causal possibility,” but there are a few different ways frame these distinctions in context with each other. Next week, I will attempt to put all of the distinctions I’ve covered into context with each other in order to explore the various ways these terms can overlap and conflict.

      Posted in Series | 29 Comments | Tagged a posteriori, a priori, academia, epistemology, knowledge, lexicon, philosophy, vocabulary
    ← Older posts
    • Looking for Something?

    • Enter your email address to follow this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

      Join 422 other followers

    • Follow on Bloglovin
    • Popular Posts & Pages

      • The Writers Roast
      • About my Soliloquies
      • A Bit of Winter Hygge
      • Of Physical Laws and Fictional Characters
      • For Ever, and Ever, and Ever
      • Why the ALS Ice Bucket Challenge is a Good Thing
      • The Philosopher's Lexicon: Apophatic Theology
      • The Blacksmith's Apprentice: a Poem
      • 30 Days of Painting, Day 1: Floral Vine and Lace Doodles
      • 30 Days of Painting, Day 28: Sunset Colors
    • Tags

      academia acrylic acrylics aquinas arendt art Augustine awards beach books C.S. Lewis christmas definitions dictionary editing ephemerality epistemology favorite words feynman Fiction film food god harry potter history husserl hygge illustration kindle language learning lexicon libraries links list literary time consciousness literature logic longreads magic medieval Metaphysics music myth my work NaNoWriMo nature painting pensieve philosopher fridays philosophy photography Plato poetry reading reason reblog religion Rousseau science snow spring stories storytelling syllabus temporality theology time tolkien trees vikings vocabulary water colors words writing
    • The Archives

    • top blog sites
      top blog sites

Create a free website or blog at WordPress.com.

Cancel

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Loading Comments...
Comment
    ×
    Privacy & Cookies: This site uses cookies. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use.
    To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Cookie Policy