Welcome to Philosopher Fridays, where I tackle philosophers I find inspiring, interesting, intriguing, and occasionally, incomprehensible and even infuriating. These entries are not meant to be in any way comprehensive or reflective of the general opinion held by the scholarly community. This will be the last Philosopher Fridays entry for a little while, as I’ll be shifting my focus to building up The Philosopher’s Lexicon in the next few weeks.
BERKELEY: George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, was an early modern philosopher, born in Ireland 1685 and died in Oxford in 1753. While he wrote widely, covering everything from apologetics to medicine, he is undoubtedly most famous for his defense of what is known as empirical idealism, subjective idealism, or immaterialism, depending on who you ask. He took the central tenet of empiricism – simply put, that “seeing is believing” – to it’s furthest conclusion, arguing that sensing objects isn’t merely epistemology important, but ontologically constitutive. To put it even more succinctly, he argued that an object could not exist unless it was being actively perceived.
In modern parlance, the words “empiricism” and “apologetics” are not often found in such close proximity, but in early modern philosophy, it was not so unusual. Empiricism, in its purest form, is the notion that the only things which can be known – and thus, justified – are things which can be perceived by the senses. If this is the case, argued Berkeley, then there is no reason to believe that there is a true objective existence outside of our experience.
What we’re left with is pure subjectivity. To the spider, the water bottle appears undoubtedly large, but to us, it seems relatively small. To our view from a position adjacent to the table, it appears to have only two legs, and it is not until we change positions that we are able to verify that there is another pair of legs on the other side, during which time we might lose sight of the original pair.
Without immediate verification of an object, for the pure (or naive) empiricist like Berkeley, there is no way to say with any certainty that the object exists. Even if we have seen the object before, the moment we turn our backs we no longer have the justification of our perception. All we have available to us, then, is the image in front of our eyes, or the idea of the object we construct in our minds in the object’s absence. With this in mind, Berkeley’s empiricism becomes a doctrine of immaterialism, as there is no way to guarantee that any material object exists independent of a mind immediately perceiving it. The mind becomes the locus of reality, and our perception is more than just a way for us to know the object – perception is constitutive. Thus, “the world consists of nothing but minds and ideas”. Berkeley didn’t just think that something must be perceived in order to be known; he thought that a thing must be perceived in order to be.
All we can have assurance of is the idea of the object, which we can call to mind at any time, rendering his vision of empiricism utterly idealist in nature. But this kind of empirical idealism comes with a built-in problem: if all we can know are the ideas of objects in our own minds, how can we share experiences, or explain object permanence? How can things continue to exist in understandable and predicable ways (as in ideas), even if we are not there to perceive them? Why wouldn’t everything just be randomly constituted as we perceived things in utterly solipsistic ways? Or rather: If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound?
Of course, if there truly was no one around to hear the tree fall, then there’s no way to say that there was a tree in the first place, far from it making any sound. The answer, for Berkeley, is simple. If there was someone there to perceive the tree, that someone would also necessarily perceive the sound. And here comes his apologetics: the fact that we have shared experiences and object permanence is evidence that there is always someone perceiving all things that exist, and that there must be an immortal, all-perceiving being grounding our existence for us.
Which brings me to the main reason I’ve decided to devote a week to Berkeley; I give you his answer to the question of the tree, in the form of a limerick:
God in the Quad
There was a young man who said “God
Must find it exceedingly odd
To think that the tree
Should continue to be
When there’s no one about in the quad.”
Reply:
“Dear Sir: Your astonishment’s odd;
I am always about in the quad.
And that’s why the tree
Will continue to be
Since observed by, Yours faithfully, God.”
I thought this would be a nice way to continue the St. Patrick’s Day celebration just a bit longer. Even the most critiqued and rejected philosophy can be delightful if rendered in the form of a limerick, don’t you think?
Stories & Soliloquies 
19 thoughts on “Philosopher Fridays: Berkeley”
whitefrozen
I’ve always thought Berkeley was the most consistent of the Cartesians.
M. Joelle
He is logically consistent, you can’t fault him there! But I think there’s a theological danger in making everything the immediate perception of God – a lot of what makes theology (particularly Abrahamic theology) compelling for a lot of thinkers is the distance between God and creation, and what we get by coming through that mediation. Perhaps I don’t know Berkely as well as I should, but I think there’s a potential at least to collapse that mediation too much. Am I wrong? I’d love to have this explained.
whitefrozen
The collapse of the creator/creation distinction is a good criticism – if everything = God’s mental activity, then I don’t really see how that distinction can be maintained. If we wish to remain within the bounds of the classical theistic tradition, anyway, then that distinction must be maintained (and is why I personally reject the various panentheisms that are becoming in vogue in the more Hegelian-influenced theological circles).
On a philosophical level, though, I think there are more damaging critiques – even if we grant that all we experience is our ideas, it doesn’t follow from that that there are only ideas – there is an unjustified leap there, unless we simply accept Berkeley’s empiricism, in which case, the game seems to be kind of rigged. Really though, the same problem that plagues any reductionism or monism is present here – if one claims that there is only X, then the question to be pressed is, ‘how does one know that?’ Only via meta-X!
Although, thinking a bit more on it, this issue really turns on Malebrance’s occasionalism – which in turn depends on Descartes distinction between material/immaterial substance and interaction. Berkely, as you noted, is the consistent outworking of the rationalist trajector that they belonged to.
I don’t know if you’re familiar with Etinne Gilson, but he wrote a fantastic little book about realism/idealism with some pretty pointed critiques of it – I can link it if you’ve not read it. Sorry for the lengthy ramble!
M. Joelle
Hegelian pantheism is in vogue? That must be why nearly every Hegel article and book I read for a while started out with “But this isn’t pan-theistic because…” and then all of the sudden they didn’t have this clause anymore.
I think Berkeley’s biggest leap is Platonic in nature, taken to its most extreme conclusion – the assumption that what is knowable and what is real are the same thing.
I’m familiar with Gilson, but not very – I’ll have to check it out. And thank you for the lengthy ramble! I found it quite interesting.
whitefrozen
Hegel is definitely big in a lot of Protestant theology – being on becoming, historicization of God’s being, Trinity being interpreted as moments in the development of the being of God. Etc etc.
Here’s the Gilson book – this is actually a shorter excerpt from a larger work that can be read on its own: http://inters.org/Gilson-Realist-Handbook (it’s a quick read)
‘A something beyond thought may well be unthinkable, but it is certain that allknowledge implies a something beyond thought. The fact that this something-beyond-thought is given us by knowledge only in thought, does not prevent it being a something beyond. But the idealist always confuses “being which is given in thought” with “being which is given by thought.” For anyone who starts from knowledge, a something beyond thought is so obviously thinkable that this is the only kind of thought for which there can be a beyond.’
‘ There is nothing, therefore, to stop the realist going, by way of reflective analysis, from the object as given in knowledge to the intellect and the knowing subject. Quite the contrary, this is the only way he has of assuring himself of the existence and nature of the knowing subject. Res sunt, ergo cognosco, ergo sum res cognoscens [Things exist, therefore I know, therefore I am a knowing subject]. What distinguishes the realist from the idealist is not that one refuses to undertake this analysis whereas the other is willing to, but that the realist refuses to take the final term of his analysis for a principle generating the thing being analyzed. Because the analysis of knowledge leads us to the conclusion “I think,” it does not follow that this “I think” is the first principle of knowledge. Because every representation is, in fact, a thought, it does not follow that it is only a thought, or that an “I think” conditions all my representations.’
rung2diotimasladder
I missed out on Berkeley in college, so thanks for the crash course!
M. Joelle
Any time! I mostly wanted an excuse to post the limerick. Also, knowing this limerick by heart is great for cocktail parties when someone brings up the “If a tree falls in a forest” puzzler. You’ve got an answer that takes the conversation to a new level!
SelfAwarePatterns
Thanks. I had heard of Berkeley’s ideas from one of the philosophy overview books I read years ago, but had utterly forgotten the name that was attached to them. I can’t help noticing that if someone’s conception of God is the universe, then his version of idealism is functionally the same as materialism. Of course, as a Bishop, I’m sure that wasn’t Berkeley’s idea of God.
M. Joelle
I think that Berkeley is careful to make sure his is a doctrine of immaterialism in order to avoid the dangers of pan-theism, but as I said above to Whitefrozen, I think there are other potential issues for his ecclesiastical commitments with this version of idealism.
bloggingisaresponsibility
I had an draft on Berkely I was picking at, but you’ve done my work for me, so I’ll just reblog this! I also loved Berkeley’s justification. He argued that a problem with epistemology was how we would know our senses reflected the real world. His solution; get rid of the real world so the problem vanishes! And his position is FAR more compelling than some of the caricatures make it seem.
M. Joelle
I’m so glad you enjoyed it! I had a whole section where I went through the arguments from the Dialogues, but I found it wasn’t really adding much. I’d still love to see your take on it!
bloggingisaresponsibility
You did a great job, so I’m not sure what I can add. I’ll revisit my article and see… I might have stressed his views on how incoherent it is to talk of an object that we’re not perceiving when all we can know about the object IS our sensory information, and tie it in with his critique of language; language can create nonsense and make it seem real, which is how this confusion about objects existing out of senses arose in the first place. I’ll see if there’s enough to justify posting 🙂
M. Joelle
I think if you take exactly that and unpack it a bit, you’ll have a substantial post right there! One I’d love to read!
bloggingisaresponsibility
You convinced me to revisit it :). In fact, I was thinking of doing a follow-up to the last phenomena/ontology post, and Berkeley is very relevant to that.
James Pailly
There’s an interesting correlation with our current understanding of quantum physics, in which atomic and subatomic particles exist only as probabilities until they are observed.
M. Joelle
Really? That’s interesting – do they mean this epistemologically only, or is there an ontological claim to be made (i.e., that they require the lights or tools of observation to actually manifest)?
James Pailly
I had to reread sections of a few of my quantum physics books to make sure I was explaining this correctly. Quantum uncertainty, quantum probability, or quantum weirdness (whatever you want to call it) is not a question of experimental limitations but a fundamental truth of the nature of the universe (this is paraphrased from “In Search of Shrodinger’s Cat” by John Gribbon, page 158).
In fact, I’ve heard it said that in principle, even an omniscient observer could not know the values associated with a subatomic particle (position, momentum, etc) without taking measurements because those values do not exist (I can’t find a reference for that right now, but I think it originally comes from Niels Bohr).
So if I’m understanding the distinction between epistemology and ontology (I had to look both words up), then this is an ontological claim. It’s a claim about reality itself, not just our ability to understand reality.
It’s also a firmly established scientific theory that has so far survived every experiment that tried to disprove it. And Albert Einstein himself, whose philosophical and theological beliefs conflicted with the quantum theory, tried very, very hard to disprove it.
bloggingisaresponsibility
Reblogged this on bloggingisaresponsibility.
authorbengarrido
Berkeley sounds oddly prescient of quantum mechanics.